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Abstract
We study the impact of fiscal policies on inflation, unemployment and interest rate spreads
dynamics in an environment where firms provide liquidity. Firms link labor and asset markets
by hiring workers and issuing claims to their future profits. Matching frictions in the labor
market drastically alters the effect of fiscal policy as the tax base increases with the number of
jobs filled. As a result, labor market conditions directly affect the return on private assets and
inflation dynamics. Moreover, since frictions in decentralized financial markets exist, public
and private assets are also used as collateral. These features in the labor and financial markets
drastically change the nature of monetary equilibria. In particular, monetary steady states are
generically not unique and endogenous fluctuations are observed. Furthermore, characteristics
of the labor market affect the demand for private and public assets, making the interaction
between monetary and fiscal policies more intricate. Finally, traditional stabilization policies
based on frictionless financial and labor markets are not robust to this frictional environment.
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1 Introduction
After the global financial crisis, a certain degree of consensus emerged that a better understanding
of how private provision of liquidity and its subsequent trading in decentralized financial markets
impacts the economy would be beneficial.1 Since the crisis the U.S. Federal Reserve System has
closely followed developments in the labor market and has been concerned how unemployment
pressures affect financial markets.2 These decentralized markets and policy features have not been
fully explored by the literature. It therefore seems appropriate that underlying frameworks used to
inform policy should be further explored. These frameworks would naturally have agents trading
in centralized and decentralized financial markets with multiple assets (both private and public)
while workers face unemployment. Herein we consider such an environment where agents face
anonymity, search and bargaining frictions and study the impact of fiscal policies on inflation,
unemployment and interest rate spread dynamics.
Firms, other than hiring workers, also supply private assets (claims to their future profits) that
are useful as a store of value but also as collateral when agents trade in frictional decentralized
financial markets. Relative to environments with a fixed supply of private assets, the channels
through which monetary and fiscal policy interact are more intricate. Once the provision of
private assets is endogenous, government policies that affect firms’ profits have a direct impact
on the supply of private assets and unemployment. This is the case as firms link both the labor
and asset markets. Thus, fiscal and monetary policies affect the relative price between private
and public assets and equilibrium interest rates. Moreover, because of the decentralized labor
market, taxes affect the entry decision of firms. When firms expect future taxes to be high, they
reduce recruitment. Since the tax base increases with the number of jobs filled, government budget
balancing requires a higher tax level, in accordance with employers’ beliefs.
To better understand the extent to which fiscal policy affects inflation, unemployment and
interest rate spreads, this paper builds on Rocheteau and Rodriguez-Lopez (2014). To generate
unemployment, the environment has a frictional labor market a la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
where matched workers and firms produce the nume`raire good. Firms also supply private assets
by issuing claims to their future profits. The demand for both private and public assets arise from
a liquidity block a la Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995).3 Shi-Trejos-Wright traders can
1See Brunnermeier (2009) and Gorton and Metrick (2012a) for discussions on the main contributors to the GFC.
2The Federal Open Market Committee was, and is currently, providing guidance about the conduct of monetary
policy in relation to the evolution of unemployment. “In setting monetary policy, the Committee seeks to mitigate
deviations of inflation from its longer-run goal and deviations of employment from the Committee’s assessments
of its maximum level. These objectives are generally complementary. However, under circumstances in which the
Committee judges that the objectives are not complementary, it follows a balanced approach in promoting them, taking
into account the magnitude of the deviations and the potentially different time horizons over which employment and
inflation are projected to return to levels judged consistent with its mandate.” Statements from the Federal Open
Market Committee, January 2012, 2013, and 2014.
3These authors emphasize the role of assets (money) as media of exchange. Recently, search and bargaining
frictions have been also emphasized by Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen (2005) when describing over the counter
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produce the nume`raire good and have access to a frictionless financial market where they rebalance
their portfolio. Moreover, these traders have stochastic trading opportunities in decentralized
frictional financial markets where they obtain utility from financial services. Traders in these
markets are anonymous and face asset recognizability problems. These frictions can be overcome
by collaterized loans.
Since firms employ workers and supply private assets that are valued by traders, this environ-
ment allows us to explicitly analyze the inherent links between interest rate spreads and unem-
ployment. This is the case as firms connect the frictional asset and labor markets.4 As a result,
interest rate spreads between government bonds and private assets will depend on labor market
conditions. Moreover, as in Friedman (1956), Tobin (1961) and Brunner and Meltzer (1972), the
equilibrium price level in this environment is determined by the joint valuation of all assets. How-
ever, in contrast to Tobin (1961), interest rate spreads are not driven by the risk properties of
assets but rather by market incompleteness.
The environment we consider has the feature that labor market characteristics impact the
value of private and public assets. Moreover, non ad-valorem taxes on firms affect their entry
decisions. Thus the tax capacity of the economy is crucial for inflation dynamics. To have a
better understanding of the role of liquidity and the economy’s taxing capacity, we first analyze
an environment where only Shi-Trejos-Wright traders are taxed. We then explore and compare
the previous monetary equilibria to those resulting from an environment where all agents face non
ad-valorem taxes.
When only Shi-Trejos-Wright traders face non ad-valorem taxes and there are insufficient gov-
ernment liabilities to meet their collateral needs, interest rate spreads that depend on real bonds
exist. As a result, the government bond repayment is non-linear so multiple steady states exist,
thus sunspot equilibria can be easily constructed. When all agents (workers, firms and traders)
face non ad-valorem taxes, fiscal policies affect the firms’ decision to participate in the labor mar-
ket. In particular, when employers expect future taxes to be high, they reduce recruitment. Since
the tax base increases with the number of jobs filled, government budget balancing requires a
higher tax level, in accordance with employers’ beliefs. This fiscal channel can then potentially
generate multiple steady states regardless of the collateral needs of traders. Steady states and their
associated dynamic properties depend on both monetary and fiscal policy parameters as well as
labor market characteristics. Furthermore, monetary equilibria will typically display endogenous
volatility. Thus, traditional fiscal requirements to stabilize prices that are based on frictionless and
(OTC) financial markets. Trejos and Wright (2015) discuss the similarities and differences between the monetary
economics used by Shi (1995) or Trejos and Wright (1995), with the applications in finance used by Duffie, Garleanu
and Pedersen (2005). The authors integrate the two approaches and generate endogenous transaction patterns and
belief-based dynamics.
4In this framework we can interpret the liquidity block as OTC financial markets where trades by private firms
are collateralized with private and public assets.
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centralized environments are going to be ineffective.
By considering frictional and decentralized labor and financial markets, this paper attempts
to improve our understanding of how monetary and fiscal policy interact when agents face search,
bargaining and informational frictions. We show that the properties of monetary equilibria funda-
mentally change once the provision of private assets and unemployment are equilibrium outcomes.
2 Related Literature
Even though substantial progress has been made in understanding how financial frictions affect
the economy, much less attention has been devoted to the study of monetary and fiscal policy
interactions in economies with unemployment.5 A notable exception is the pioneering work of
Cooley and Quadrini (2004) who study the optimal monetary policy in a framework that integrates
the search theory of unemployment with firms facing cash-in-advance constraints to purchase
intermediate inputs. These authors show that when the economy is subject to productivity shocks,
the optimal policy is procyclical, and with commitment, the optimal inflation rate is inversely
related to the bargaining power of workers. Within the same spirit and using the New Keynesian
cashless framework, Ravenna and Walsh (2012) consider a frictional labor market and show that
when wages are rigid and fixed, the optimal tax correcting for inefficient hiring is small but very
volatile over the business cycle. Gains made by deviating from price stability are larger in economies
with more volatile labor flows. Building on the cashless framework, Arseneau and Chugh (2012)
consider a calibrated matching model that generates empirically relevant labor-market fluctuations
conditional on exogenous fiscal policy. The authors find that tax volatility induces dramatically
smaller, albeit efficient, fluctuations of labor markets by keeping distortions constant over the
business cycle.
Once financial markets are incomplete, so that fiat money has a role as a medium of exchange,
Berentsen et al. (2007) find that the same frictions that give fiat money a positive value generate an
inefficient quantity of goods in each trade and an inefficient number of trades in decentralized and
frictional markets. The authors show that the Friedman rule eliminates the first inefficiency and
the Hosios rule, the second. Within the same framework, Gomis-Porqueras et al (2013) show how
a production subsidy in a frictional goods market and a vacancy subsidy, financed by a dividend
tax, can achieve efficiency even when the Hosios condition does not hold.
The previous body of work has explored the link between inflation and unemployment in a
variety of environments where different frictions have been emphasized. However, much less work
has analyzed how the private provision of liquidity can affect the equilibrium relationship between
inflation and unemployment. One of the few papers that explore such an important issue is the
5We refer to Quadrini (2011) and Brunnermeier, Eisenbach and Sannikov (2013) for a recent survey of the
literature that deals with the impact of financial frictions on the macroeconomy.
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work by Rocheteau and Rodriguez-Lopez (2014). These authors find that an increase in the supply
of real government bonds raises the real interest rate, crowding out private liquidity and increasing
unemployment. If unemployment is inefficiently high, the authors show that keeping liquidity
scarce can be socially optimal. Rocheteau et al (2014) also show that a liquidity crisis (affecting
the acceptability of private assets as collateral) widens the spreads between private and public
liquidity. Subsequently unemployment increases. This paper complements this latter work by
exploring the consequences for inflation, unemployment and interest rate spreads when alternative
fiscal arrangements and fiscal policy rules are considered.
3 Environment
We build on the framework by Rocheteau and Rodriguez-Lopez (2014). Time is continuous where
three types of private agents (workers, firms and traders) participate in goods, labor and financial
markets. There is also a government that needs to finance some exogenous expenditures through
non ad-valorem taxes and the issuance of fiat money and nominal bonds.
Workers and firms participate in a frictional labor market a la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
In this market workers sell their time in exchange for a wage when producing a perishable nume`raire
good. This perishable good is consumed by all private agents and the government. Other than
producing goods, firms also issue and sell their securities to financial market participants. Traders,
on the other hand, can produce and consume the nume`raire good and have access to a frictionless
financial market where they can rebalance their portfolio. These traders are also able to produce
and consume a perishable financial service which only they value. This service is traded in a
frictional market characterized by anonymity, search and bargaining frictions as in Shi (1995) and
Trejos and Wright (1995).6
3.1 Government
The government can issue fiat money and nominal bonds in order to finance some exogenous
government expenditures. Money is a pure fiat object. Nominal bonds, on the other hand, are pure
discount bonds that yield one unit of fiat money at a Poisson rate equal to one. The government
can also levy non ad-valorem taxes. In the benchmark model the government only taxes Shi-
Trejos-Wright traders so that
G+ φmB = T + φmM˙ + φbB˙
where G are exogenous government expenditures, M is the monetary base, B represents nominal
bonds, φm (φb) denotes the real value of a unit of fiat money (a nominal bond) in terms of the
6Search and bargaining frictions have also been emphasized by Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen (2005) when
describing OTC financial markets.
5
nume`raire good and T represents the non ad-valorem tax levied to Shi-Trejos-Wright traders.
It is convenient to write the government budget constraint in terms of real government liabilities
which is given by
m˙+ b˙ = G+
˙φm
φm
m+
(
φm
φb
+
φ˙b
φb
)
b− T (1)
where m = φmM represents real balances and b = φbB denotes real bonds.
To describe the particulars of fiscal policy, we consider a fiscal rule where taxes depend on the
quantity of real government debt outstanding.7 This fiscal rule has been extensively analyzed by
the proponents of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL).8 This rule allows taxes to be a
function of real government debt which is given by
T = η0 + η1b,
where η0(η1) are constant policy parameters.
9 For the operating procedure for monetary policy,
we consider a constant money growth rate, ζ, rule so that the money supply evolves according to
M˙ = ζM .10
3.2 Workers and Firms
Workers are endowed with one indivisible unit of labor per unit of time. They are risk-neutral and
they discount future consumption at rate ρ > 0. Thus, their lifetime expected utility is given by
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdC(t)
where C(t) is their cumulative net consumption of the nume`raire good and E is the expectation
operator.
Each firm can considered as a technology that produces the nume`raire good using a worker’s
indivisible labor as input. As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), workers and firms face search
frictions and are matched bilaterally. The flow of hires is equal to h(u, v), where u denotes the
measure of unemployed workers and v represents the measure of vacancies. The matching function,
h(·, ·), has constant returns to scale, is strictly concave with respect to each of its arguments, and
satisfies Inada conditions. Then, the job finding rate of a worker is p(θ) ≡ h(u, v)/u = h(1, θ)
where θ = v/u represents the labor market tightness. Similarly, the vacancy filling rate is q(θ) ≡
7The use of a debt sustainability framework (see Ghosh et al (2013) and the references therein) is commonly used
for policy analysis as emphasized by IMF Article IV country reports.
8This literature emphasizes that bonds are denominated in nominal terms so that they may be fully backed by
real resources or backed only by nominal cash flows as initially argued by Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), Woodford
(1994) and Cochrane (2001). For more details, we refer to a recent survey by Canzoneri et al (2011).
9We abstract from enforcement issues and solely focus on the effects that a fiscal rule would have if the government
could commit to enforcing it.
10Here we sidestep the interesting and relevant issue of studying the implications of considering various interest
rate spreads in the Taylor rule.
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h(u, v)/v = h(θ−1, 1).
Upon each successful match of a worker and a firm, a constant flow of nume`raire output equal
to Φ is produced. A match is exogenously destroyed with a Poisson arrival rate of δ > 0. The
wage of an employed worker is a constant fraction of output which we denote by w.11
In order to fill a job, a firm must open a vacancy which has associated a cost flow, in terms of the
nume`raire good, equal to γ > 0. The recruiting expenses of firms are paid by Shi-Trejos-Wright
traders in exchange for claims to their future profits (nume`raire output) which they can then
securitize.12 Alternatively, we can think of firm’s recruiting expenses being paid by households
which then sell claims to Shi-Trejos-Wright traders in a competitive asset market. The critical
aspect to consider is that the Shi-Trejos-Wright traders have a demand for private liquidity when
trading in the frictional decentralzied market. The equilibrium allocation is independent of who
finances the firms’ vacancy costs, as the ultimate agents that demand these private assets are just
traders.
New firms are financed as long as the flow cost of opening a vacancy, γ, is no greater than the
flow expected value of a vacancy. Free entry then implies that
γ = q(θ)VF (2)
and the total supply of private assets corresponds to the total capitalization of firms which is given
by
Lp = nVF . (3)
As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), the resulting value of a filled job solves the following
Bellman equation
rVF = Φ− w − δVF + V˙F (4)
where r denotes the rate of return of a firm’s share, while the law of motion for employment is
given by
n˙ = p(θ)(1− n)− δn. (5)
Relative to Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), the key difference is that r is endogenous and not
necessarily equal to the time discount rate. This is the case as assets, both private and public, can
be used as collateral objects when trading in frictional and decentralized markets.
11This type of wage formation is consistent with proportional bargaining. In this paper we assume that the
government does not provide unemployment benefits.
12Securitization is a process in which different assets or portfolios of cash flow generating securities are pooled
together and then sold to third parties.
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3.3 Shi-Trejos-Wright Traders
Traders derive linear utility from the nume`raire good and from a perishable financial service, which
they can both consume and produce. The lifetime expected utility of a trader is then given by
E
[ ∞∑
n=1
e−ρTn [u(y(Tn))− x(Tn)] +
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdC(t)
]
,
where the first term represents the utility associated with financial services, while the second term
denotes the utility from net consumption of the nume`raire good. Tn represents a Poisson process
with arrival rate β >0, indicating the times at which traders are bilaterally matched. These traders
can not produce the nume`raire when trading in this frictional market; i.e, t ∈ {Tn}∞n=1.
As we can see, traders only have stochastic trading opportunities to obtain utility from financial
services. The market where these services are traded is characterized by anonymity, search frictions,
bilateral matching and bargaining as in Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995). Traders in this
market are anonymous so unsecured loans are not possible. Moreover, since traders can not always
produce the nume`raire good to pay for the financial services, a medium of exchange is required. One
potential arrangement to facilitate exchange is a secured loan.13 These features of the environment
result in demand for public assets (fiat money, M , and nominal bonds, B) and private assets (a) by
these traders.14 After trading has occurred in the decentralized market, Shi-Trejos-Wright agents
can rebalance their portfolio in a frictionless financial market.
Upon a successful bilateral match, a trader is chosen at random, with equal probability, to be
either a supplier or a user of financial services. The utility from consuming y units of financial
services is u(y) while the disutility from producing x units of financial services is x.15 The exact
terms of trade in this decentralized financial market are determined by a buyer take-it-or-leave-it
offer. A contract is then a pair, (y, d), that specifies a production of services, y, in exchange for
a payment, d. Such contract is consistent with a collateralized loan where the buyer promises to
repay d units of nume´raire as soon as he exits the decentralized financial market. The repayment
of this loan is secured by the deposit of d units of acceptable assets.16
Traders face collateral differences among the public and private assets they hold in their portfo-
lio. This is the case as not all traders can equally authenticate assets (which buyers can costlessly
counterfeit) as fraudulent.17 As a result, in a fraction µm of bilateral matches only fiat money is
13When buying assets from firms, traders can fully diversify their portfolio of different equities via securitization
of large pools of assets which can turn these private claims into safe and liquid assets.
14It is important to note that since workers are risk-neutral (no need for consumption smoothing), the demand
for liquid assets is entirely driven by Shi-Trejos-Wright traders.
15As in Lagos and Rocheteau (2009), one could interpret u(y) as a reduced-form utility function that stands in
for the various reasons why investors may want to hold different quantities of the asset. Differences in collateral
needs, financing or financial-distress costs, correlation of asset returns with endowments (hedging needs) or relative
tax disadvantages.
16Alternatively, the contract can also be viewed as the buyer paying directly with assets.
17This could also be interpreted as reflecting the complexity in some financial products.
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acceptable as collateral because the other two potentially fraudulent assets can not be recognized.18
Similarly, in a fraction µg of matches, fiat money and government bonds are useful as collateral.
19
For the remaining fraction of matches, µp =1 −µm − µg, all public and private assets can be used
as collateral to secure the loan.20
Let W (A0) denote the lifetime expected discounted utility of Shi-Trejos-Wright trader that is
holding A(t) liquid assets (i.e. claims on firms’ profits, real government bonds and real balances).
The trader needs to decide his asset holdings, A(t)=(a(t), b(t), m(t)), consumption path, c(t),
and discrete jumps, ∆j , in order to maximize her discounted cumulative consumption and the
present continuation value of a trading opportunity in the frictional market. Formally, the trader’s
problem is given by
W (A0) = max
a,b,m,c,k,{∆j ,tj}
E
∫ T1
0
e−ρtc(t)dt−
k∑
j=1
e−ρtj∆jI{tj≤T1} + e
−ρT1Z [A(T1)]
 (6)
s.t. a˙+ m˙+ b˙ = rmm+ rgb+ ra− c− T for all t 6= tj (7)
∆j ≡ C(t+j )− C(t−j ) for all j = 1, ..., k (8)
where A0=(a0, b0,m0) are the initial asset conditions, T1 is the random time at which the trader
is bilaterally matched, rm(rg) represents the return on real balances (real bonds) and I{tj≤T1} is
an indicator function that is equal to one if tj ≤ T1 (and zero otherwise). The second term of
equation (6) represents lumpy consumption (production if ∆j < 0) financed by discrete jumps
in asset holdings. The trader chooses both the sizes of these discrete adjustments, ∆j , and their
timing, tj , where k denotes the number of adjustments. Finally, Z [A(T1)] denotes the value of
trading in the decentralized financial market.
Using the fact that T1 is exponentially distributed with arrival rate β and results from Seierstad
and Sydsaeter (1987), equations (6) through (8) are equivalent to that of a portfolio problem with
initial real money balances, real bonds and private assets (m0, g0, a0). More precisely, we have that
max
a˙,m˙,b˙,b,a,m,c
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−(β+ρ)t {c(t) + β Z[A(t)]} dt
]
s.t. a˙+ m˙+ b˙ = rmm+ rgb+ ra− c−T (9)
where the continuation value of a Shi-Trejos-Wright trader once matched, Z(A), is given by
Z(A) =
µp
2
max
yp≤m+b+a
[u(yp)− yp] + µg
2
max
yg≤m+b
[u(yg)− yg] + µm
2
max
ym≤m
[u(ym)− ym];
which captures that the terms of trade are given by a buyer take-it-or-leave-it offer, that a trader
has equal probability to be a buyer or a seller and that not all assets can be used as collateral in
18One can endogenize these fractions by introducing a costly technology to authenticate assets (e.g Lester et al,
2012), or an informational asymmetry regarding the terminal value of the asset through an adverse selection problem
(e.g Rocheteau, 2011) or a moral hazard problem (e.g Li et al, 2012).
19As in Canzoneri and Diba (2005), government bonds can also provide liquidity services. In this environment,
private assets also provide such services.
20Financial regulation, such as the Dodd-Frank Act, could also impact the values of µm and µg.
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all states of the world.
As we can see from (9), the trader has access to a frictionless centralized financial market to
rebalance his portfolio. Moreover, public and private assets serve as a store of value and collateral.
The trader’s optimal portfolio links the return of the various assets with the collateral needs of
Shi-Trejos-Wright traders which are given by
ρ− r
σ
= µp[u
′(yp)− 1];
ρ− rg
σ
= µg[u
′(yg)− 1];
ρ− rm
σ
= µm[u
′(ym)− 1];
where yp = min{m + b + Lp, y∗}, yg = min{m + b, y∗}, ym = min{m, y∗}, u′(y∗) = 1 and 1/σ
denotes the expected time before the trader receives an opportunity to purchase financial services.
Since fiat money yields no dividend, its rate of return is given by
rm =
φ˙m
φm
;
while the price of bonds solves the following asset pricing condition,
rgφb = φm − φb + φ˙b;
which rules out any arbitrage opportunity.
Private assets dominate government bonds in their rate of return (r> rg) whenever µg > 0
and yg< y∗. Similarly, if µm> 0 and ym< y∗ government bonds have a greater return than fiat
money (rg> rm). Spreads depend on government policies and the frictions in decentralized labor
and financial markets.
As in Friedman (1956), Tobin (1961) and Brunner and Meltzer (1972), the equilibrium price
level is determined by the valuation of all assets jointly. However, in contrast to Tobin (1961),
interest rate spreads are not driven by the risk properties of assets but rather by market frictions.
The different uses that assets can have, as store of value and/or collateral objects, and how they
are traded have a direct impact on their value. Understanding inflation dynamics then requires an
explicit description of how agents trade and settle transactions in frictional markets as assets can
provide more than a store of value role.
4 Monetary Equilibrium
In this section we study the equilibrium properties of our frictional economy.
Definition 1 Given some exogenous government expenditures, a constant money growth rate and
a fiscal policy rule that links taxes with government debt, a monetary equilibrium is an allocation of
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real assets, {m, b, a}, labor market outcomes, {θ, n}, goods and services, {C, y}, as well as interest
rates, {rm, rg, r}, that satisfies the optimality conditions of workers, firms and traders while labor
and financial markets clear.
After imposing market clearing and private agents’ optimality conditions, the resulting mone-
tary dynamic equilibrium is given by a system of non-linear differential equations that specify the
evolution of the real government liabilities, firms’ value and employed workers. More precisely, we
have that
m˙ = m
(
ζ +
φ˙m
φm
)
; (10)
m˙+ b˙ = G+
φ˙m
φm
m+
[
φm
φb
+
φ˙b
φb
]
b− (η0 + η1b); (11)
V˙F = rVF − (Φ− w − δVF ); (12)
n˙ = h(1, θ)(1− n)− δn; (13)
where VF =
γ
h(θ−1,1) and the interest rate spreads are given by
r − rg = µgσ(u′(yg)− 1); (14)
rg − rm = µmσ(u′(ym)− 1); (15)
r = ρ− σµp[u′(yp)− 1]. (16)
Depending on the underlying fundamentals and government policies, different monetary equi-
libria can emerge. These arise depending on which of the various collateral constraints bind. Note
that inflation dynamics critically depend on the collateral services of fiat money, relative to other
assets. This is the case as inflation is intimately linked to the return on fiat money which is given
by
φ˙m
φm
= ρ− σµp[u′(yp)− 1]− σµg[u′(yg)− 1]− σµm[u′(ym)− 1].
From now on, to simplify exposition, we assume specific functional forms so that h(1, θ) =
Aθ1−α and u(x) = Dxν . In the next sections we characterize monetary equilibria that deliver the
first best level of financial services in some states of the world. We first characterize the equilibria
when total government liabilities are plentiful to satisfy the collateral needs of traders. Finally,
we study the case where all assets (private and public) are needed to meet the collateral needs of
Shi-Trejos-Wright traders.
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4.1 Plentiful Government Liabilities
Fiat money alone is not sufficient to satisfy the collateral needs of traders, however, all government
liabilities can. This situation is consistent with economies that have positive nominal interest rates.
However, since all government liabilities (fiat money and government bonds) meet the collateral
needs of traders, there is no interest rate spread between private claims and government bonds so
that rg = r = ρ. It is easy to show that the corresponding dynamic monetary equilibrium is then
given by
m˙ = m
(
ζ + ρ+ µmσ − µmσνDmν−1
)
; (17)
b˙ = G−mζ + (1 + ρ− η1) b− η0; (18)
θ˙ =
θ
α
[
(ρ+ δ)− (Φ− w)Aθ
−α
γ
]
; (19)
n˙ = Aθ1−α(1− n)− δn; (20)
where m < y∗ and m + b ≥ y∗ which reflects that private assets are not required to satisfy the
collateral needs of Shi-Trejos-Wright traders.
Steady States
Let us consider a situation where m˙ = b˙ = n˙ = θ˙ = 0. It is easy to show that a unique monetary
steady state exists where real balances and labor market tightness are given by
m =
(
Dνµmσ
ρ+ ζ + µmσ
) 1
1−ν
; θ =
(
A(Φ− w)
γ(ρ+ δ)
) 1
α
;
while real bonds and employment are given by
b =
ζm+ η0 −G
1 + ρ− η1 ; n =
Aθ1−α
Aθ1−α + δ
.
Finally, the resulting steady state inflation is exactly equal to the money growth rate.
Lemma 2 Monetary (ζ) and fiscal policies (η0, η1) do not affect the steady state unemployment
rate. Moreover, changes in job separation rates (δ), matching efficiency (A) and vacancy costs (γ)
do not affect real balances nor real bonds.
Since Shi-Trejos-Wright traders can produce the nume`raire good and have enough public assets
to satisfy their collateral needs, the demand of private assets issued by the firm are not of first
order importance for traders. As a result, the labor market characteristics are inconsequential for
the portfolio allocation of Shi-Trejos-Wright traders.
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Local Dynamics
The dynamic monetary equilibria displays a dichotomy between asset and labor markets. More-
over, the evolution of real balances is independent of the evolution of government debt. The
corresponding characteristic polynomial is given by
p(λ) = (a11 − λ)(a22 − λ)(a33 − λ)(a44 − λ);
where aij denotes the (i, j) element of the Jacobian. Note that the eigenvalues associated with the
asset market (i.e. the first two rows of the Jacobian) are independent of each other and from those
associated with the labor market (i.e. the third and fourth rows of the Jacobian). The resulting
asset market eigenvalues are given by
λ1 = (1− ν)(µmσ + ρ+ ζ); λ2 = 1 + ρ− η1;
while the labor market eigenvalues are
λ3 = ρ+ δ, λ4 = −
(
δ +A
(
A(Φ− w)
(ρ+ δ)γ
) 1−α
α
)
.
Lemma 3 Monetary policy (ζ) can not alter the local determinacy properties.
This is the case, as when we approach to the zero lower bound (ζ → −ρ), the monetary
eigenvalue, λ1, can not change sign. Monetary policy can only then affect the rate of conver-
gence/divergence towards the steady state. Similar properties are obtained in environments with
frictionless financial and labor markets where the central bank follows a money growth rate rule.
Lemma 4 The monetary equilibria is dynamically determinate whenever fiscal policy is such that
η1 > 1 + ρ.
When government assets provide enough collateral to Shi-Trejos-Wright traders, we recover
the standard stabilization policy prescriptions obtained in frictionless labor and financial markets
under a money growth rate rule.21 In particular, the unique monetary equilibrium is dynamically
determinate (indeterminate) when the fiscal is such that η1 > 1 + ρ (η1 < 1 + ρ), unsurprisingly
given that taxes are pure lump sum and there are no interest rate spreads between bonds and
private assets.
To summarize, when the government provides enough government liabilities to satisfy the
collateral needs of Shi-Trejos-Wright traders, neither the particulars of the financial architecture
(centralized and decentralized) nor the details of the labor market (frictional or frictionless) change
the traditional fiscal requirements for price stability.
21It is easy to check that in Leeper (1991) money in the utility function model or Woodford’s (1998) cashless
economy, the same stabilization prescription is obtained.
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4.1.1 Numerical Exercise
A numerical analysis is required to determine the quantitative implications. We can then evaluate
the responsiveness of traditional stabilization fiscal policies relative to labor market characteristics.
Parameters are chosen to represent an economy where government liabilities are enough to cover the
collateral needs of traders. To discipline parameter values for the labor market, we closely follow
Shimer (2005) who considers data for the U.S. from 1951 to 2003.22 The unit of time represents
one quarter, thus we set ρ = 0.012 so that the annual real interest rates is approximately 5%. The
job destruction rate is set such that δ=0.1 which is consistent with Shimer’s (2005) observation
that jobs last approximately two and a half years on average. He also estimates that job finding
rates are 0.45 per month. Following Shimer (2005), we normalize labor market tightness, θ=1, so
that the worker-finding rate is equal to the job-finding rate. Therefore, we have that α= 0.72 and
A=1.35. Arseneau and Chugh (2012) find that the cost of advertising a vacancy is 3% of total firm
output, which yields a γ=0.03 when we normalize firm output to one so that Φ=1. We then set
w= 0.6 to be consistent with the labor share and set G= 0.21 so that government expenditures to
GDP over the period equals 13%.
For the decentralized financial market, we normalize D=1. We follow Chiu and Koppel (2016)
and assume that traders are active in the market at Poisson rate σ= 2.27 which is consistent with
observed turnover rates.23 Finally, given the average annual inflation rate over this period is 3.5%,
we try to reproduce the observed base money to GDP ratio of 6.3% over the same period. To do
so we set µm=0.016 and ν=0.5.
Under this benchmark parametrization, the labor market eigenvalues are λ3 = 0.112 and
λ4 = −7.309. In order for fiscal policy to have a grater role in stabilizing the economy, fiscal policy
has to be such that λ2< λ4, which implies that η1 > 8.309. Fiscal policy has to be exceptionally
responsive to bond issuance.
4.2 Insufficient Government Liabilities
This situation shows the importance of considering the endogenous private provision of assets
which are useful in decentralized frictional financial markets. Relative to the plentiful government
liabilities, the evolution of market tightness and employment are the same. However, the dynamics
for government liabilities differ. The resulting dynamic equilibrium is given by equations (19), (20)
and
m˙ = m
(
ζ + ρ+ µmσ − µmσνDmν−1 − µgσ(νD(m+ b)ν−1 − 1)
)
(21)
22We refer to Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2005) for a detailed discussion of the calibration.
23Bao, Pan and Wang (2008) give turnover rates between one and two years for corporate bonds, while Goldstein,
Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) give the annual rate in the range of 0.8-1.2. See also Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007).
Data for structured products are not readily available.
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b˙ = G−mζ + (1 + ρ+ µgσ − η1 − µgσνD(m+ b)ν−1) b− η0 (22)
where m + b < y∗ and m + b + nγθ
α
A ≥ y∗ reflecting that private assets are relevant to satisfy the
collateral needs of traders.24
Notice that the return on government bonds is now lower than that which would have been
obtained with private assets; i.e, r = ρ > rg. The spread explicitly depends on the characteristics
of the decentralized financial market which is given by
rb = ρ− µgσ(νD(m+ b)ν−1 − 1).
Private assets and government bonds are not perfect substitutes; neither as a store of value nor
as collateral objects.25 This spread reflects that Shi-Trejos-Wright traders are willing to buy
government bonds at a higher price because of the additional collateral services they provide.
As we can see from equation (21), the evolution of real balances now depends on government
debt. Thus the fiscal position of the government has a direct impact on inflation dynamics. In
particular, the return on fiat money is such that
φ˙m
φm
= ρ− µmσ(νDmν−1 − 1)− µgσ(νD(m+ b)ν−1 − 1)
which depends on all government liabilities.
Steady States
After imposing the steady state conditions on equations, real balances are implicitly given by
ζm+ ρ− µmσ(Dνmν−1 − 1) = µg(Dν(m+ b(m))ν−1 − 1); (23)
where b(m) = G−mζ−η0
ζ+η1−1−σµm(νDmν−1−1) and the steady state labor market observables are given by
θ =
(
A(Φ− w)
γ(ρ+ δ)
) 1
α
; n =
Aθ1−α
Aθ1−α + δ
.
After having characterized steady state equilibria, we can now establish certain properties. All
proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 5 The monetary steady state is generically not unique.
This result is not surprising as interest rate spreads explicitly depend on real bonds. Now the
government faces an interest payment that is non-linear in bonds outstanding. This non-linearity
allows the possibility of two monetary steady states to exist. This situation reflects the bond
seignorage revenue. In this situation part of government revenues respond to fiscal policy which
24Recall that the private provision of liquidity is carried out by active firms so that Lp = n γθ
α
A
.
25Private assets and government bonds are not perfect substitutes as collateral objects as typically we have that
µg 6= 1− µm − µg.
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drastically changes inflation expectations as current fiscal choices are necessarily linked to future
fiscal and monetary policy actions. It is important to highlight that this Laffer curve is purely
driven by the collateral needs of Shi-Trejos-Wright traders.
We can conclude then that different asset combinations that deliver plentiful collateral are
critically important in generating multiple steady states. Moreover, they also change how inflation
expectations are formed. Finally, given the possibility of multiple steady states, sunspot equilibria
can be easily constructed which further complicates the design of stabilization policies.26
Local Dynamics
The characteristic polynomial associated with an economy where all assets are required to meet
the collateral needs of traders is given by
p(λ) = (a33 − λ)(a44 − λ)[(a11 − λ)(a22 − λ)− a12a21].
As we can see, the eigenvalues of the labor block are independent of those corresponding to the
asset market. Moreover, now the eigenvalues associated with the asset market are not independent
of each other. In particular, the asset market eigenvalues are given by
λ1 =
a11 + a22 +
√
(a11 + a22)2 − 4(a11a22 − a12a21)
2
;
λ2 =
a11 + a22 −
√
(a11 + a22)2 − 4(a11a22 − a12a21)
2
;
while the labor market eigenvalues are
λ3 = −
(
δ +A
(
A(Φ− w)
(ρ+ δ)γ
) 1−α
α
)
; λ4 = ρ+ δ;
where the different elements of the Jacobian are given by
a11 = σν(1− ν)D[µmmν−1 + µgm (m+ b(m))ν−2]; a12 = σν(1− ν)Dµgm (m+ b(m))ν−2;
a21 = −ζ + b(m) σν(1− ν)Dµg(m+ b(m))ν−2;
a22 = 1 + ρ+ µgσ − µgσνD(m+ b(m))ν−1 − η1 + µgσν(1− ν)D b(m) (m+ b(m))ν−2;
where m is the solution to equation (23).
Lemma 6 The eigenvalues associated with the labor market are not affected by monetary nor fiscal
policies.
As in the previous section, there is a decoupling between the labor and financial markets. Such
is the case as government policies are not directly affecting the supply of private assets. Moreover,
26This feature resulting from the liquidity properties of bonds, is not observed in frameworks with frictionless
financial markets.
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the return on private assets is the natural interest rate in the economy. Thus, neither monetary
nor fiscal policies can further increase the attractiveness of private assets as useful collateral or as
a store of value.
Lemma 7 The eigenvalues associated with the asset market depend on both monetary and fiscal
policy parameters.
When private assets are required to provide the desired collateral needs by traders, the effects
of all government policies jointly affect the stability properties of the eigenvalues associated with
the asset market. This is not surprising as all policies alter the spread between private and public
assets. This is in sharp contrast with frictionless labor and financial markets where the eigenvalues
associated with the asset market are decoupled, so that one eigenvalue only depends on monetary
policy parameters and the other depends only on fiscal parameters.
4.2.1 Numerical Exercise
To quantify the monetary equilibria the previous benchmark calibration needs to be modified, in
particular, the parameters reflecting the demand for financial services. To do so we consider a one
time permanent shock so that the level of utility per unit per financial service, D, goes from 1 to
2. This captures disruptions in the financial market relative to normal times. As a result, agents
require more assets to pledge as collateral.
With this later parametrization, Table 1 reports some monetary equilibria with the correspond-
ing steady state market tightness, employment, real balances, real bonds and interest rate spreads
as well as their eigenvalues.
η0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
η1 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01
µm 0.016 0.016 0.01 0.01
µg 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
ζ 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009
θ 1158.68 1158.68 1158.68 1158.68
n 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989
m 0.544 0.853 0.645 0.817
b 0.451 0.13 0.34 0.165
ρ− rg 0.004 0.016 0.015 0.018
λ1 0.01 -0.11 0.003 -0.004
λ2 0.961 0.971 0.96 0.964
λ3 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112
λ4 -7.309 -7.309 -7.309 -7.309
Table 1: Equilibria when only traders are taxed and government assets are scarce.
As we can see from Table 1, multiple steady states exist. This is the case irrespective of a fiscal
stance; i.e. 1+ρ < η1 or 1+ρ > η1. In particular, the steady state associated with a larger interest
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rate spread is dynamically determinate and is associated with the largest issuance of government
bonds in steady state. On the other hand, the steady state with the lower spread is dynamically
indeterminate and has associated the smallest government bonds in steady state. This is in sharp
contrast to the case where there are no interest rate spreads.
Numerical results also show that the steady state level of tax revenues (η0, η1) are critically
important in determining interest rate spreads and the rate of convergence to the steady state.
This is in sharp contrast to models with frictionless financial and labor markets, where tax revenues
in the long run do not affect the nature of stabilization policies. Finally, the qualitative properties
highlighted in Table 1 are robust to various departures from the benchmark parametrization.27
Summarizing, the composition of assets that deliver plentiful assets for collateral purposes is
key in determining the properties of monetary equilibria. This is the case as different combinations
of assets meeting the collateral needs of traders can imply interest rate spreads between government
bonds and private assets. The existence of these spreads allows for all government policies to affect
the degree of substitution between private and public assets as store of value through changes
in the interest rate spread. Moreover, it can deliver multiple steady states. Thus it follows that
conventional stabilization policies obtained in frictionless environments are not going to be effective.
5 Taxing Capacity
To better understand how the varying collateral needs of traders interact with the fiscal capacity
of an economy, we now consider an alternative tax scheme where all agents are taxed. Herein,
active firms and workers also face non ad-valorem taxes. This alternative taxing structure is not
as innocuous as it may seem. Other than increasing the fiscal backing of bonds, this new tax
scheme impacts firms’ hiring decisions, as taxes now affect the value of the firm.28 As a result,
part of the total tax base (the one corresponding active firms) responds to fiscal policies as it
affects entry decisions. This holds true even when taxes are non ad-valorem. When firms expect
future taxes to be high, they reduce recruitment. Since the tax base increases with the number of
jobs filled, government budget balancing requires a higher tax level, in accordance with employers’
beliefs about future policies. This fiscal channel arising from the frictional labor market, drastically
changes inflation expectations relative to environments frictionless labor markets. In frictionless
environments, the total amount of revenue impacts inflation expectations and not the specifics of
who pays taxes as they are pure lump sum. Once the labor market is frictional, this property does
27Similar results are obtained when fiat money is not important relative to nominal bonds and private assets as
collateral (µm is small). Wee consider different curvatures to the payoff of financial services and the expected time
before the trader receives an opportunity to purchase financial services is reduced (increased) (which translates to
an increase (decrease) in σ).
28The fact that fiscal policy affects the supply of private assets that competes with public assets in traders portfolio
captures Tobin’s (1981) view of policy: “The obvious point that taxation lowers expected yields is not the whole story,
because it changes the entire distribution of (uncertain) returns”.
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not hold true anymore. This additional expectational channel has important implications for the
evolution of inflation, debt, unemployment and interest rate spreads. We analyze these differences
in the next sections.
5.1 Plentiful Government Liabilities
Relative to the benchmark model where only Shi-Trejos-Wright traders are taxed, the evolution of
real balances and employment remain the same. However, the dynamics for real bonds and market
tightness are different. The new dynamic monetary equilibria is given by equations (17), (20) and
the new evolution for government bonds and market tightness are given by
b˙ = G−mζ + (1 + ρ− (1 + 2n)η1) b− (1 + 2n)η0; (24)
θ˙ =
θ
α
[
(ρ+ δ)− (Φ− w − (η0 + η1b))Aθ
−α
γ
]
; (25)
where m < y∗ and m+ b ≥ y∗.
In this new taxing scheme, the dynamics of labor market tightness, θ, (which are related to
firms’ profits) explicitly depends on the evolution of real bonds. This is not surprising given that
the fiscal rule links the evolution of taxes to real bonds. Unemployment, on the other hand, is
indirectly affected by fiscal and monetary policies through the dynamics of labor market tightness.
This is the case as taxes affect the entry decisions of firms. Once entry costs are covered, the
level of taxes influence the firm’s ability to issue private claims. The value of these private assets
is further affected by the government’s ability to issue fiat money and bonds that compete with
private assets both as a store of value and as collateral.
Labor market characteristics and outcomes also affect asset market dynamics. This is the case
as a number of factors directly affect the value of the firm, including labor market conditions, the
costs of posting vacancies and the severity of the labor market frictions. The resulting profits, in
turn, affect the firm’s ability to provide private liquidity to financial markets.29
Steady States
After imposing the steady state conditions and substituting equations (25) and (19) into equation
(26), we have that the steady state market tightness is implicitly given by
(ρ+ δ)γθα
A
= Φ− w − η0 − η1 b(θ); (26)
where m=
(
Dνµmσ
ρ+ζ+µmσ
) 1
1−ν
, n(θ)= Aθ
1−α
Aθ1−α+δ and b(θ)=
(1+2n(θ))η0+mζ−G
1+ρ−η1(1+2n(θ)) .
Proposition 8 The monetary steady state equilibria is generically not unique.
29Gatti et al (2012) show that for 18 OECD countries over the pre-crises period, 1980-2004, the impact of financial
variables depend strongly on the labor market context while the impact of labor market characteristics on financial
markets appears to be less significant.
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In contrast to the case where only traders were taxed, this equilibria has the property that
multiple steady states can not be ruled out. This result is not surprising as non ad-valorem
taxes affect the entry decisions of firms, impacting their hiring decisions and the supply of private
liquidity. As a result, the tax base stemming from firms’ activities will respond to changes in taxes
delivering a “Laffer curve”. Similar results in the pure labor search context are found in Rocheteau
(1999a, 1999b).30
Local Dynamics
The evolution of labor market outcomes are not independent of the real value of government debt.
The corresponding characteristic polynomial associated to this monetary equilibria is given by
p(λ) = (a11 − λ)[(a22 − λ)(a33 − λ)(a44 − λ) + a34a43a24];
where the different elements of the Jacobian are given by
a11 = (1−ν)(ρ+ζ+µmσ); a22 = 1+ρ−(1+2n(θ))η1; a24 = −2 (η0 + η1b(θ)) ; a32 = η1θ
1−αA
αγ
a33 =
Aθ−α(Φ− w − η0 − η1b(θ))
γ
; a43 = A(1− α)(1− n)θ−α; a44 = −(Aθ1−α + δ);
where θ is the solution to equation (26). The eigenvalues corresponding to the asset and labor
market are not completely decoupled. One of the asset market eigenvalues is given by
λ1 = (1− ν)(ρ+ ζ + µmσ);
while the rest are roots to the following cubic polynomial p3(λ)=(a22−λ)(a33−λ)(a44−λ)+a32a43a24.
Lemma 9 A monetary equilibria will typically display endogenous volatility.
Endogenous volatility is likely as the generic solution to a cubic polynomial has two complex
roots. As a result, unemployment and inflation will fluctuate even when the environment has no
exogenous shocks. This endogenous volatility is consistent with the results found in Rocheteau
(1999a) in the pure labor market context.31
Lemma 10 Eigenvalues depend on both monetary and fiscal policy parameters as well as the
characteristics of the labor market.
The steady state tax revenue and the money growth rate affect the magnitude of the eigenvalues.
This is not surprising as part of the tax base can respond to changes in the tax policy which agents
30The author finds that under a balanced-budget rule, the existence of multiple equilibria is a generic property.
The government can lead the economy to a high equilibrium by fixing the rate of tax on wages and then setting the
replacement ratio so that its expenditure matches its receipts.
31Rocheteau (1999a) shows that a balanced-budget rule is able to generate endogenous cycles.
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take as given. Thus, traditional fiscal policy prescriptions to stabilize prices are unlikely to be
effective. This is the case as multiple equilibria can be observed and the stability properties of the
eigenvalues associated with the asset market depend on both monetary and fiscal policy parameters.
This holds even when there are no interest rate spreads. These different policy implications arise
from labor experiencing market search frictions. Taxing these productive activities, even when
these are non ad-valorem, change the firm’s entry decision which ultimately affects the fiscal
backing of bonds. The exact composition of tax revenues matters when frictional labor markets
are present.
5.1.1 Numerical Exercise
We consider the same baseline calibration used in Section 4.1.1 where no interest rate spreads are
observed. Table 2 reports some monetary equilibria.
η0 -0.45 -0.45 -0.5 -0.5
η1 1.013 1.013 0.98 0.98
ζ 0.0085 0.0085 0.0085 0.0085
θ 0.022 90.8867 0.85 16.341
n 0.823 0.979 0.928 0.967
m 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.115
b 0.839 0.776 0.916 0.899
λ1 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032
λ2 -3.439 -4.875 -2.371 -3.094
λ3 0.659-2.188 i -1.978 -0.347-0.602 i -1.793
λ4 0.659+2.188 i 0.108 -0.347+0.602 i 0.084
Table 2: Equilibria when all agents are taxed and µm=0.016.
As we can see, the multiplicity of steady states are observed regardless whether the fiscal
authority follows policy, such that η1>1+ρ or η1<1+ρ. The monetary steady state associated
with the largest government debt is dynamically indeterminate and exhibits endogenous volatility.
In contrast, the steady state with the smallest government debt is dynamically determinate and
does not exhibit damped oscillations. Irrespective as to whether fiscal policy is aggressive or
passive, the tax revenue in the steady state critically affects the speed of convergence (divergence)
and the size of the endogenous fluctuations.
These equilibrium properties are in sharp contrast to the case where traders are the only private
agents being taxed. This difference highlights the importance of taxation in environments with
frictional labor markets. Not considering the labor market a la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
is not as innocuous as it may seem as it drastically changes the nature of monetary equilibria.
It not only yields different predictions regarding the dynamic properties, but also in terms of the
multiplicity of equilibria. These differences are observed even when there are no interest rate
spreads. This a direct consequence of the composition of the total tax revenues. In frictionless
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environments, the total amount of revenue impacts inflation expectations and not the specifics of
who pays the taxes as they are pure lump sum. Once the labor market is frictional, this is not
the case, as non ad-valorem taxes affect marginal decisions, ultimately impacting the taxable base.
Finally, the qualitative properties highlighted in Table 2 are robust to various departures from the
benchmark parametrization.
5.2 Insufficient Government Liabilities
The evolution of real balances and employment remain the same relative to the benchmark model
where only Shi-Trejos-Wright traders are taxed. However, the dynamics of real bonds and market
tightness change as to reflect the new taxing environment. When all government liabilities are
sufficient to meet the collateral needs, it is easy to show that the dynamic monetary equilibrium
is given by equations (20), (21) and
b˙ = G−mζ + (1 + ρ+ µgσ − (1 + 2n)η1 − µgσν(m+ b)ν−1) b− (1 + 2n)η0; (27)
θ˙ =
θ
α
[
(ρ+ δ)− (Φ− w − (η0 + η1b))Aθ
−α
γ
]
; (28)
where m+ b < y∗ and m+ b+ nγθ
α
A ≥ y∗.
As in the case where government liabilities provide enough liquidity provided, the dynamics of
labor market tightness depend on the evolution of real bonds. Similarly, unemployment dynamics
are indirectly affected by the evolution of real bonds through labor market tightness. Finally, the
spread between public and private assets is given by
rb = ρ− µgσ(νD(m+ b)ν−1 − 1)
and the evolution of inflation depends on the dynamics of all government liabilities.
Steady States
After imposing the steady state conditions, the stationary monetary equilibria solves the following
system of equations for real balances (m) and real bonds (b) are given by
ζ + ρ− µmσ(Dνmν−1 − 1) = σµg(Dν(m+ b)ν−1 − 1); (29)
G−mζ − (1 + 2 n(b)) η0 + (1 + ρ− (1 + 2 n(b)) η1) b = b σµg(Dν(m+ b)ν−1 − 1); (30)
where labor market observables are such that θ(b) =
(
A(Φ−w−η0−η1 b)
γ(ρ+δ)
) 1
α
and n(b) = A θ(b)
1−α
A θ(b)1−α+δ .
Note that in this monetary equilibrium, agents acquire government bonds because of their
collateral value in decentralized financial markets, thus exhibiting a liquidity premium.
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Local Dynamics
The corresponding characteristic polynomial associated to the Jacobian of this monetary equilibria
is given by
p(λ) = (a11 − λ)[(a22 − λ)(a33 − λ)(a44 − λ) + a32a43a24]− a12a21(a33 − λ)(a44 − λ).
As we can see, there is no decoupling of the asset market and the labor market eigenvalues. These
eigenvalues depend on asset and labor market characteristics. This is sharp contrast to what is
typically found in the literature of centralized and frictionless financial and labor markets. The
eigenvalues are roots to quartic polynomial given by
p(λ) = A4λ4 +A3λ3 +A2λ2A1λ+A0
where Ai are non-linear functions of the different elements of the Jacobian which are given by
a11 = σν(1− ν)D[µmmν−1 + µgm (m+ b)ν−2];
a12 = σν(1− ν)Dµgm (m+ b)ν−2;
a21 = −ζ + b σν(1− ν)Dµg(m+ b)ν−2;
a22 = 1 + ρ+ µgσ − µgσνD(m+ b)ν−1 − η1(1 + 2n(b)) + µgσν(1− ν)D b (m+ b)ν−2;
a24 = −2 (η0 + η1b) ;
a32 =
A θ(b)1−αη1
αγ
;
a33 =
A θ(b)−α(Φ− w − η0 − η1b)
γ
;
a43 = A(1− α)(1− n) θ(b)−α; a44 = −(A θ(b)1−α + δ);
where m is the solution to equation (23).
Lemma 11 Asset and labor market eigenvalues will typically depend on the specifics of monetary
and fiscal policies and the characteristics of the frictional labor and financial market.
With this new tax scheme, all policies impact firm’s profits which intimately link labor and asset
markets by hiring workers and issuing equity. Since fiscal policies affect the entry decision of firms,
government policies directly impact the tax base, ultimately changing the fiscal backing of bonds.
Moreover, since the tax base increases with the number of jobs filled, government budget balancing
requires a higher tax level, in accordance with employers’ beliefs about future policies. This fiscal
channel (arising from the frictional labor market) drastically affects inflation expectations. Thus,
traditional stabilization policies are not expected to be effective.
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Lemma 12 A monetary equilibria will typically display endogenous volatility.
This is the case as the solution to a quartic polynomial generically has complex roots. As a
result, unemployment and inflation will fluctuate even when the environment has no exogenous
shocks.
5.2.1 Numerical Exercise
A numerical analysis is required to determine the impact of traditional stabilization fiscal policies
on this frictional environment. The underlying parameter values are the same as in Section 4.2.1.
Table 3 reports some monetary equilibria.
η0 -0.25 -0.25 -0.3 -0.3
η1 1 1 1.013 1.013
µm 0.001 0.001 0.0001 0.0001
µg 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
ζ 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
θ 344.1687 0.0003 282.36 0.0006
n 0.986 0.575 0.985 0.626
m 0.504 0.338 0.439 0.297
b 0.483 0.65 0.548 0.691
ρ− rg 0.012 0.11 0.0119 0.0118
λ1 -7.029 -6.905 -6.655 -6.02
λ2 -1.61 0.33 -1.587 0.288
λ3 0.111 3.13-5.767 i 0.111 2.626-4.96 i
λ4 0.6 3.13+5.767 i 0.539 2.626+4.96 i
Table 3: Equilibria when all agents are taxed.
In contrast to traditional frictionless labor and financial market frameworks, multiplicity of
equilibria are observed regardless as to whether fiscal policy is aggressive or passive. The equilib-
rium associated with the steady state with largest unemployment is dynamically indeterminate.
Locally, inflation and unemployment will converge to the steady steady with fluctuations that
grow over time when η1 < 1 + ρ is followed. On the other hand, the equilibrium associated with
the steady state with lowest unemployment is dynamically determinate. In contrast, when the
fiscal authorities follow η1 > 1 +ρ policy, endogenous volatility is always observed regardless if the
unemployment is high or low.
6 Conclusions
The global financial crisis has highlighted a new set of imperfections associated with financial and
labor markets that should be taken into account when thinking about policy. In order to better
inform policymakers, frameworks should have agents trading various financial markets (frictionless
and centralized as well as frictional and decentralized ) with multiple assets (both private and
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public), where workers face unemployment and firms issue private assets that can be used as a
store of value and collateral.
The properties of monetary equilibria fundamentally change once firms (other than hiring
workers in decentralized labor markets) also supply private assets that are valued by traders
because of their collateral and store of value functions. This is the case as firms connect the
frictional asset and labor markets. As a result, interest rate spreads between government bonds
and private assets will depend on labor market conditions. Moreover, as in Tobin (1961), the
equilibrium price level is determined by the joint valuation of all assets. However, in contrast
to this author, interest rate spreads are not driven by the risk properties of assets but rather by
market incompleteness. Thus the specific nature of the financial frictions are going to be key in
shaping inflation dynamics.
In this frictional environment fiscal policies not only affect the equilibrium interest rate spreads
but also the tax base. These features allow multiple steady states to be generically observed. This
multiplicity can be generated by two channels. One is characterized by the collateral value of assets
in decentralzied frictional financial markets. These imperfections generate a liquidity premium so
that a bond seignorage Laffer curve is observed. The other source of multiplicity is a direct
consequence of the composition of the tax revenues. In this frictional environment taxes on firms
directly affect their entry decision, making them distortionary. This then generates the traditional
Laffer curve.
Finally, this frictional environment has an additional channel through which inflation expec-
tations are modified which is drastically different relative to environments with frictionless labor
markets. More precisely, firms reduce recruitment when they expect future taxes to be high. Since
the tax base increases with the number of jobs filled, government budget balancing requires a higher
tax level, in accordance with employers’ beliefs about future policies. It is then not surprising that
monetary equilibria will typically exhibit endogenous volatility. Thus, because of the existence
of multiple steady states and endogenous volatility, traditional stabilization policies obtained in
frictionless labor and financial environments are not effective. We can conclude then that ignoring
the frictional features in financial and labor markets is not as innocuous as it may seem a priori
as they predict drastically different equilibrium properties.
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Appendix
Proof Proposition 5
Let us define the LHS as the left hand side and RHS as the right hand side of equation (23),
respectively. It is easy to show that LHS is increasing in m while the RHS is non-monotonic. Thus,
we can rule out the existence of multiple steady states.
Proof Proposition 8 The left hand side of equation (26) is always increasing in θ while the
right hand side is non-monotonic. Thus, we can rule out the existence of multiple steady states.
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